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ABSTRACT
Implicit a itudes are mental states posited by psychologists to explain behaviors including
implicit racial and gender bias. In this paper I investigate the belief view of the implicit
a itudes, on which implicit a itudes are a kind of implicit belief. In particular, I focus on why
implicit a itudes, if they are beliefs, are often resistant to updating in light of new evidence. I
argue that extant versions of the belief view do not give a satisfactory account of this
phenomenon. This is because proponents of the belief view have focused on overly narrow
explanations of recalcitrance in terms of belief storage. Expanding the focus of the belief view to
the kinds of irrational and arational transitions between beliefs and other mental states provides
compelling (if preliminary) explanations of recalcitrance.
1. Introduction
Consider John:
Bias. John seems to sincerely endorse the claim that women and men are both equally
cut out for the work at his company. Nonetheless, when given a choice between
similarly qualified male and female candidates, John usually hires the man. When
presented with evidence of the quality of work that women can do for his company, his
behavior does not change.
There is a disconnect between what John believes (or at least claims to believe) and his behavior.
He seems to be a card-carrying egalitarian about gender in the workplace, but his behavior
mirrors that of an old-school sexist. John might be lying about what he believes, of course. But1
assume he is not. Another possibility is psychologically more interesting. John might believe
that women and men are equally well cut out for the work, but also might harbor some other
a itude that conflicts with his beliefs and drives his behavior.
There is a significant amount of work in social and cognitive psychology dedicated to
this possibility, where the second, discordant a itude is referred to as an implicit a itude.
1 Explicit sexism is an important causal driver of workplace inequality [Koch et al. 2014], and the
following discussion is not meant to minimize the role that explicit prejudice plays in discrimination.
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Psychologists posit implicit a itudes in order to give satisfactory explanations for a range of
dissonance cases:
- Explicitly egalitarian instructors who show negative implicit a itudes towards Black
students are more likely to grade them harshly [Jacoby-Senghor et al. 2016].
- Healthcare professionals with negative implicit biases towards minority groups are
more likely to minimize their pain and provide them with substandard treatment
[Chapman et al. 2013].
- Consumers with no explicit preferences for products can develop implicit a itudes
towards a brand that strongly influences the decision to buy (say) toothpaste under time
pressure [Friese et al. 2006].
Philosophers of mind have developed a litany of proposals for making sense of the implicit
a itudes. Inter alia, it has been proposed that implicit a itudes are constituted by associations
between concepts [Holroyd 2016; Byrd 2019], aliefs [Gendler 2008; Madva 2016], beliefs
[Mandelbaum 2016; Egan 2011; Frankish 2016], affective tension clusters [Brownstein 2018],
character traits [Machery 2016], the outputs of three separate evaluation systems [Huebner
2016], reasoning structures without corresponding states [Johnson 2020], imaginings
[Welpinghus 2020; Sullivan-Bisse  2019], mental imagery [Nanay forthcoming], and sui generis
cognitive states like patchy endorsements [Levy 2015] and in-between beliefs [Schwi gebel
2010]. Understanding the character and function of implicit a itudes is important, both for the
philosophical project of accounting for the states that furnish the mind, and for normative
projects that a empt to evaluate agents and their actions, where the influence of implicit
a itudes may loom large.2
2 On the way I am using the term ‘implicit a itude,’ an implicit a itude is whatever mental state (or suite
of mental states) explains behaviors like Bias. While it often seems that these states are inaccessible or
unconscious in many cases, my account does not define implicit a itudes in terms of their inaccessibility
(see, in contrast, Mandelbaum [2016]). I do this, in part, because there is significant controversy
concerning whether or not implicit a itudes are, in fact, consciously inaccessible [Gawronski et al. 2006;
Toribio 2018].
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In this paper I focus on the belief view. This view says that the implicit a itudes are best
thought of as a species of the familiar psychological kind BELIEF. John may explicitly believe in
equal treatment for men and women in the workplace, but he also harbors some other belief (an
implicit belief) that says otherwise. In slogan form: implicit a itudes are implicit beliefs. While
the belief view has been bolstered by recent results in implicit a itude research, I think a central
question for the belief view has yet to receive a satisfying answer: if implicit a itudes are beliefs,
why are they often radically resistant to rational updating in light of new evidence? I argue that
previous a empts to reconcile evidence recalcitrance with the belief view are less than
satisfactory. But I argue this is partially because proponents of the belief view have focused
narrowly on explaining recalcitrance in terms of architecture for belief storage. If, instead, we
focus on inferential transitions between beliefs and other mental states, I argue the belief view
looks much more plausible. While these explanations await further empirical verification, they
provide us with strong (initial) reason to endorse the belief view.
2. The belief view
While there are several differing versions of the belief view, they can be characterized3
by a common core idea:
Belief view. In central cases (especially ones similar to Bias), implicit a itudes are
implicit beliefs.
The belief view explains John’s behavior like so: John may genuinely believe that men and
women are equally cut out for the work, but he also harbors a different kind of belief, one that is
not so egalitarian. This implicit belief, developed over the course of years of being exposed to a
culture that tends to portray women as homemakers and men as breadwinners, influences his
3 Prominent proponents of the belief view of the implicit a itudes include Mandelbaum [2016], Egan
[2011], Frankish [2016], De Houwer [2014], and Gertler [2011].
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hiring decisions. His implicit belief might crowd out his more explicit egalitarian commitments
in several ways: it might be active under cognitive load or distraction [Wigboldus et al. 2004], or
it might primarily function as a tiebreaker when candidates otherwise seem relatively similarly
qualified [Ulhmann and Cohen 2005]. Nonetheless, implicit beliefs can influence our behavior in
a host of pernicious, if subtle, ways.
This kind of explanation, in virtue of invoking a reasons-responsive propositional
a itude like belief, proposes that implicit a itudes operate in rational ways. This stands in sharp
contrast to another kind of explanation that is often given for implicit bias, on which the
functioning of implicit a itudes is arational. An (oversimplified) model: John tends to associate4
the concept MAN with WORK, and the concept WOMAN with HOME. Because of this association,
he is much more likely to think of MAN when in WORK-priming environments, and it is this
disposition that makes him more likely to hire the man for the job. On these kinds of
explanations, the relations between implicit a itudes, their environment, and behavior is merely
causal: associations between concepts do not update in response to evidence, nor do they enter
into inferences with other mental states to influence behavior. In short, the opponents of the5
belief view are commi ed to a dissimilarity between the functional roles of implicit a itudes
and the canonical functional roles of belief.
Mandelbaum [2016] offers a litany of evidence in support of the belief view, focusing on
making the positive case that implicit a itudes have the capacity to respond to evidence.
Mandelbaum argues that implicit a itudes seem to engage in something similar to ‘the enemy
of my enemy is my friend’ reasoning [Gawronski et al. 2005]: subjects who are negatively
5 Accounts of implicit bias that entail their arationality include Gendler [2008; 2011], Madva [2016],
Brownstein [2018], and Holroyd [2016].
4 Using the term ‘rational’ in this way entails that the complement of a rational mental state is an arational
mental state, not an irrational one. Implicit a itudes can be well-a uned or mis-a uned to the evidence,
but what makes them rational (in this sense) is their capacity to respond to evidence, in contrast to those
states that cannot respond at all.
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implicitly biased against some group, and learn that others are similarly negatively biased, tend
to develop a positive implicit a itude towards this second group. This is easy to explain if
implicit a itudes can track evidence-based conditions like who is disposed to like whom, but
hard to explain if implicit a itudes are mere concatenations of arational associations. He also
argues that implicit a itudes are directly modulated by the strength of arguments [Briñol et al.
2009], and can be formed on the basis of abstract learning rather than repeated conditioning
[Gregg et al. 2006]. These pieces of evidence point towards a rational, rather than merely causal,
pa ern of function for implicit a itudes.
More recent research offers further evidence that implicit a itudes can update in
response to evidence in paradigmatically belief-like ways. Implicit impressions of the
trustworthiness of others’ faces, for instance, can be updated when countervailing evidence is
presented to the subject, provided the evidence is marked and diagnostic [Shen, Mann, &
Ferguson 2020]. Implicit a itudes about the behavior of moral agents track the same fixation
and modulation mechanisms as explicit beliefs about the subject, a mixture of observable
behavior and inferred mental states of agents [Kurdi, Krosch, and Ferguson 2020]. In particular,
this body of work has shown that properties of presented information that make a difference to
the rational character of that information also make a difference to whether subjects update
their implicit a itudes. Whether a piece of information is diagnostic of the content of the implicit
a itude (that is, revealing of the nature of that thing) and whether it is believable (roughly,
whether it coheres with how the subject otherwise approaches the content) are both predictive
of whether subjects immediately change their a itudes when presented with new evidence
[Ferguson et al. 2019] and whether those changes persist [Cone, Flaharty, and Ferguson 2021].
In other words, implicit a itudes seem to have the capacity to (and very often do!) update in
light of new evidence in much the same way as beliefs.
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This empirical story has not gone unchallenged. Some of the studies and interpretations
that Mandelbaum presents in his paper have been questioned. Briñol et al. [2009], for instance,
has been criticized for being statistically underpowered in a way that undermines the possible
import the study might have for the belief view (see the methodological discussions in Byrd
[2019]). Some have also thought the interpretations Mandelbaum and others have given of
empirical results tend to be objectionably selective. Mandelbaum’s interpretation of Gawronski
et al. [2005], for example, as supporting a kind of ‘enemy-of-my-enemy’ reasoning, is in direct
contradiction with the interpretation that the authors themselves give of their own work. And
there remain many in the empirical literature skeptical of the ability of evidence to change our
implicit a itudes (Lai et al. [2016]), though more recent work presents a picture more favorable
to the belief theorist [Mann and Ferguson 2015; Cone, Flaharty, and Ferguson 2021]. For our
purposes, it will be sufficient to note that the proper interpretation of the empirical literature
surrounding the belief view is one that remains significantly controversial, and neither the belief
view nor associationism should be considered the default interpretation of this literature.6
All of these issues are ones that, ultimately, a belief theorist must deal with, though there
are reasons to be hopeful that such a response is in the offing (see Bendana & Mandelbaum
[forthcoming]). In any case, this is not the line of argument against the belief view I want to
focus on in this paper. I instead want to focus on a different kind of response to the belief view,7
one that has been undertheorized until now. This response admits that implicit a itudes
sometimes function in rational ways, but points to other cases where implicit a itudes seem to
function in strikingly irrational ways. While implicit a itudes might be propositional a itudes
7 Indeed, I believe that even if all of the concerns raised above are valid ones, the remainder of the paper
is still of significant interest. The project would then be a conditional one, asking the reader to
temporarily accept the belief view (whatever its flaws) and see whether it can deal with a heretofore
underexplored problem. I think it can, and think this success actually gives us resources to make sense of
some of the controversy already discussed. I am thankful to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to
make this way of approaching the paper more clear.
6 My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me on some of these points.
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of some kind, why specifically think that they are beliefs, given their shocking resistance to
updating in many cases [Levy 2015]? If one has to go so far as undertaking weeks of
love-and-kindness meditation to undo the effects of an implicit a itude [Kang et al. 2014], why
think that implicit a itude is anything like what we normally think of as BELIEF? These theorists
develop alternative propositional accounts of implicit a itudes that seek to explain the same
data as the belief view, but with the added benefit of being able to make sense of evidence
insensitivity in a way the belief view cannot. I think this objection is a strong one, and the
proponent of the belief view should have something to say in response.
3. The problem of recalcitrance
The belief view of the implicit a itudes seems implausible to many, in part, because of
significant evidence of recalcitrance in implicit a itudes. Beliefs are mental states that are
paradigmatically evidence sensitive: in general, beliefs tend to update in light of new evidence.8
Even if the evidence marshalled in Section 2 demonstrates that implicit a itudes often do
respond to evidence in belief-like ways, beliefs do not tend to paradigmatically function in some
of the odd ways that implicit a itudes often function, and this cries out for explanation. Some
representative findings:
- Subjects who demonstrate implicit biases against Black candidates for a professorship,
when given arguments for the effectiveness and moral worth of affirmative action, not
only tend to ignore that evidence, but often end up demonstrating more implicitly
biased behaviors against Black candidates as a result [Gawronski et al. 2008].
- Subjects with anti-Black implicit a itudes often have to go through extensive therapies,
such as love-and-kindness meditation [Kang et al. 2014], in order to stably change their
implicit a itudes.
- Merely being exposed to the words ‘Muslim’ and ‘terrorist,’ even when reviewing
statements like ‘it is wrong to think of all Muslims as terrorists,’ is sufficient to cause an
increase in anti-Muslim implicit a itudes in subjects [Deutsch and Strack 2010].
8 The exact modal operator needed to make sense of this tendency is controversial; see Shah and Velleman
[2005] and Helton [2020] for some differing views.
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It is incumbent on proponents of the belief view to be able to account for this recalcitrance. If
implicit a itudes are beliefs, why do they not function the way we expect beliefs to function in
these, and many other, cases (cf. Madva [2016])?
One response denies that beliefs, in general, have to have the capacity to respond to
evidence in order to truly be beliefs [Viedge 2018]. Just as some argue that delusions might be
beliefs without having the capacity to ever respond to evidence, so too might implicit a itudes.9
Alternatively, perhaps for a mental state to be a belief, it is necessary for it to belong to a mental
kind that is paradigmatically evidence sensitive, even if individual instances of the kind might
completely lack this sensitivity. While there is an interesting metaphysical debate to be had here
about necessary conditions for belief, I think this is an unsatisfying way to account for the
nature of the implicit a itudes for at least two reasons. First, this view of belief is non-standard
in the philosophy of mind. A defense of the belief view of the implicit a itudes that begins by
adopting a view of belief that many would not accept loses much of the motivation for
assimilating implicit a itudes to a more familiar psychological category in the first place.
Additionally, given my theoretical interest in the rational dynamics of implicit thought, this
move is particularly unsatisfying, since it removes some beliefs from the realm of rational
evaluation. If a mental state lacks even the capacity to respond to evidence, how can it be
rational or irrational for subjects to hold that belief (cf. Helton [2020])? For these reasons, I will
place the evidence-resistant view of belief to the side going forward.
A more popular approach for explaining the evidence-insensitivity of implicit beliefs
centers on the idea of mental fragmentation. The basic idea of fragmentation involves rejecting the
9 The literature on delusions, in fact, represents a great comparison case for our purposes, since
doxasticists about delusion also must make sense of significant evidence of recalcitrance in delusions.
Flores [2021] presents a compelling argument, similar in both content and spirit to the current argument,
in the delusion context: the purported evidence recalcitrance of delusions is not evidence against
doxasticism, since there are many plausible masking mechanisms that explain why a particular delusion
might not update in a particular case. This paper adopts a similar approach for implicit a itudes.
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idea that there is a single interconnected web of belief that subjects maintain. Instead, subjects
have several different webs of belief, desires, and intentions (collectively called fragments), and
there are importantly different coherence properties between and within fragments. Beliefs that
lay within the same fragment will tend to be coherent with one another, but there is no
coherence requirement for beliefs across fragments. Modeling beliefs in this way allows us to
make sense, for instance, of Lewis [1982]’s self-report that he seemed to believe (i) that Nassau
Street runs east-west, (ii) that the train tracks run north-south, and (iii) that the train tracks and
Nassau Street run in parallel. Each belief occupies its own belief fragment, and since they are
very rarely active at the same time, there is no pressure for interfragment coherence. A similar
story can be told about explicit and implicit beliefs: they each occupy a different belief fragment,
and there is often li le coherence between them. John may explicitly believe that men and
women are equally cut out for the work, but this belief is powerless when his implicit fragment
is active.10
As an account of the mental architecture of humans, the fragmentation account seems
plausible, and I argue below that a version of the account can explain some of the recalcitrance
of implicit a itudes. But I think existing fragmentation accounts fail to offer us a satisfying
account of the recalcitrance of implicit beliefs. They offer li le explanation why sometimes the
same implicit a itudes respond to evidence well and other times do so poorly. On one version of
the fragmentation view, the interpretationist version, this is by design [Elga and Rayo
forthcoming]. Interpretationist fragmentation theory takes a subject’s recalcitrant irrationality as
a datum to be incorporated into a systematized theory that can satisfactorily capture a subject’s
behavior. These theories are explanatory in some sense: interpertationist fragmentation theories
‘identify pa erns and show that relevant facts are instances of those pa erns’ [Elga and Rayo
10 The general theory of fragmentation is developed by, inter alia, Stalnaker [1984], Stitch [1990], and
Greco [2014].
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forthcoming: 6]. But they do not offer an account of the origins of the pa erns, since they aim to
be theoretically neutral about the underlying architecture that might produce behavior. Given
the goals of this kind of fragmentation theory, it is not an objection to point out that the theory
merely systematizes a subject’s response. But this also means that interpretationist
fragmentation theory cannot give us a theory of recalcitrance that will help defend the belief
view from its opponents [Norby 2014].
The realist version of fragmentationism, defended by Bendana and Mandelbaum
[forthcoming], in contrast, does a empt to give an explanation of the rational function of
different fragments. On their way of understanding implicit a itude formation and revision,11
implicit beliefs about social groups are housed in many psychologically real, redundant
fragments that are tokened in particular contexts. When John considers the arguments for
equality in the workplace, he creates a fragment that believes that men and women are equal.
But when he implicitly encodes stereotypes about women being homemakers, he encodes this
belief in a different fragment. Working hard in one context to overcome a particular a itude will
not tend to change other beliefs that are stored in other fragments. This, in turn, is meant to
explain why short-term a empts to change implicit a itudes often fail, while long-term
strategies are often more successful.
On Bendana and Mandelbaum’s formulation, fragments obey what they call the
Environmental Principle, which states that:
novel fragments are opened up in novel environments. According to this principle,
when one is visiting Spain for the first time, one opens up a new fragment with SPAIN as
the heading. Of course, one doesn’t just visit Spain, one goes to the Madrid airport or the
Sagrada Familia. For each of these places, we assume that a new fragment will be
opened [Bendana and Mandelbaum forthcoming: 29].
11 For instance: ‘fragmentation can... explain seemingly disparate social psychological findings regarding
implicit bias’ [Bendana and Mandelbaum forthcoming: 10].
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It follows from the hyperspecificity of the Environmental Principle that, in general, there will be
no story to tell about why some beliefs are held in response to evidence and others are not.12
That is just the way those beliefs were encoded in their particular contexts. The concept of
fragmentation, at least in its Environmental Principle formulation, cannot explain either
evidence sensitivity or recalcitrance of a single implicit a itude. The fact that one and the same
implicit a itude seems to be evidence sensitive in some contexts and radically resistant to
evidential updating is only explained, if it is explained at all, in terms of two different a itudes
being tokened at two different times, with one of the tokenings being responsive but not
another. There is no further fact to be had about the rational response of implicit a itudes. But
this is just to leave the crucial question of recalcitrance unanswered.
4. Belief, inference, transition
The two most thorough extant accounts of fragmentation, then, fail to bolster the belief
view, either by methodological design or because of hyperspecificity of fragment individuation.
These approaches a empt to explain implicit a itude recalcitrance in terms of belief storage
mechanisms: implicit beliefs do not respond to evidence or other rational pressure because they
are housed in fragments without strong connections to other fragments. Focusing only on
storage, however, threatens to unnecessarily hamper the explanatory resources available to the
belief view. In this section, I argue that focusing on mental transitions, especially rationally
evaluable inferential transitions, gives the belief view a new host of explanatory possibilities for
making sense of evidence recalcitrance in implicit a itudes.13
13 Despite my critique of the extreme fragmentation account he prefers, my approach represents a clear
continuation of the Mandelbaum [2016] project of laying out the belief view. Mandelbaum discusses
evidence of genuine evidential updating, arguing the arationality approach is mistaken and that implicit
12 This is an instance of a general worry for fragmentation theory that Elga and Rayo raise, arguing that
the theory must ensure that ‘access table’s elicitation conditions are not individuated too finely.
Otherwise, an access table might become a mere listing of overly specific dispositions, and so fail to
provide useful explanations of behavior’ [Elga and Rayo forthcoming: 6].
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4.1 The messiness of belief
Pre-theoretically, one might think belief states are those that only enter into rational
transitions representable by simple logical deductions. But this idealized picture is hopeless for
making sense of human belief systems, where rational transitions between premises and
conclusions sit next to all manner of irrational and arational belief-involving transitions. As an
example, one such effect is the tendency for beliefs to enter into associative relations in virtue of
their contents [Johnston 1995]. If I believe that Arsenal will win the Cup next year, I will tend to
associate ARSENAL with CUP in a way I would not with another concept like CHAIR. And this will
in turn make it more likely that I show classic associative behaviors, being quicker to activate
one of the concepts when the other is activated.
Another transition, particularly important for the argument I make here, comes from the
literature on motivated reasoning. Motivated reasoning is a broad category of mental transitions
where favored conclusions are reached via methods that seek to ensure their outcomes
whatever incoming evidence might be presented to the subject [Kunda 1990]. A favorite
philosophical example of motivated reasoning is wishful thinking: a subject desires that p be true,
and she thereby gathers and evaluates evidence in a way that seeks to confirm p [Siegel 2017].
Wishful thinking offers a kind of rational (as opposed to merely causal) explanation for the
recalcitrance of our favored beliefs from updating: updating is blocked by certain upstream
factors that influence the flow and evaluation of evidence, removing any rational pressure on
the belief itself to update (by avoiding sources one thinks might provide one with
counterevidence, or by developing alternative hypotheses that can explain counterevidence
away).
a itudes can respond rationally to evidence. I argue that there are many arational and irrational effects on
beliefs that, in turn, explain the remaining implicit a itude recalcitrance to updating.
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A particular form of motivated reasoning is importantly tied to our self-conceptions and
self-esteem [Mandelbaum 2019]. Most non-depressed subjects are fundamentally convinced that
they are good people. This creates a strong incentive for us to find a way to discount evidence
that seems to cast doubt on our fundamental goodness. Indeed, there is a litany of psychological
evidence that people will go to great lengths to avoid confronting evidence of their moral
transgressions [Shikta et al. 2005]. One popular strategy involves delineating which actions stem
from a ‘true self’ from actions that can be a ributed to external factors causing the agent to
behave in a certain way [Newman, De Freitas, and Knobe 2015]. If I have done something
reprehensible, there is significantly less rational burden on me to think of myself as a bad
person if the reason I performed the action is external (for instance, if I was distracted and
allowed bad advice to guide me), rather than something about my deep character. In this way, I
can diffuse the rational pressure of the evidence in front of me, and my positive core belief
about myself can remain unchanged.
The explanatory resources of the belief view are thus more expansive than a narrow
concentration on fragmented belief storage might suggest. Even at the level of explicit belief,
there are a whole host of ways that beliefs can become enmeshed in networks that produce
irrational or arational transitions between belief states. I next argue the belief theorist should
apply the same explanatory resources to the case of implicit belief.
4.2 Implicit wishful thinking
Building on the previous section, I here want to argue that motivated reasoning and
wishful thinking can occur in the implicit as well as the explicit domain. Many of the results that
push theorists away from the belief view can be explained by an interaction between affect,
cognition, and motivation at the implicit level, just as such deviations can be explained in the
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more explicit cases discussed above. As far as I am aware, this proposal has never been
theorized or worked out in detail, so what I present here is a mere sketch. Nonetheless, I think
the sketch is a compelling way to extend the belief view.
Here is a toy example to help set up the model. It is plausible (see below) that subjects
not only have implicit cognitive a itudes towards others in social groups, but also implicit
prejudices and animus towards them, as well as implicit self-conceptions which are usually
positive. Suppose a particular white subject holds (a) an implicit belief that Black men are lazy,
(b) an implicit racial animus towards Black men, and (c) a positive implicit self-conception. As it
stands, (a) and (b) seem to put some rational pressure on (c): if he really is such a good person,
why does he house this animus towards members of a particular group? The subject can resolve
this pressure, however, if he thinks there is good evidence in favor of (a), and that this evidence
justifies his prejudice in (b). This is, in fact, the result we see in racial bias research: there tends
to be a mutually reinforcing network between believing that white privilege does not exist, that
members of other racial groups do not get ahead because they do not work hard enough, and
corresponding racial animus and positive self-esteem [Wilkins and Kaiser 2014].
Social psychologists have established the plausibility of distinguishing between implicit
cognition, affect, and motivation. Different implicit a itude measures, for one thing, are thought
to pick out cognitive (the Implicit Association Task [Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwar  1998]),
affective (the Implicit Positive and Negative Affect Test [Quirin, Khazen, and Kuhl 2009]), and
self-esteem (a modified form of the IAT [Yamaguchi et al. 2007]) aspects of implicit thinking.
Psychologists have also found evidence of interactions between these states that justify giving
them the structure corresponding to their labels: for instance, when a person’s self-esteem is
threatened (by losing a contest in something the subject cares about, for instance), there tends to
be an overcompensation to ward off possible negative self-feeling, as well as a corresponding
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increase in in-group bias as a further way to dismiss the threat [Rudman, Dohn, and Fairchild
2007]. So not only does it seem we are able to pick out implicit states that have similarities to the
kinds of functions we would normally pick out with the terms ‘cognitive,’ ‘affective,’ and
‘motivational,’ it also seems these states interact in ways similar to the ways these states interact
explicitly. It is this kind of interaction that the belief view should look to exploit.
Thinking about the interaction between implicit belief, affect, and motivation can help
explain many of the puzzling results we have already gestured at in this paper. The model, for
instance, can explain the otherwise odd a itudinal backfiring of implicit a itudes cited above
[Gawronski et al. 2008]. In order to discount evidence that goes against one’s favored beliefs,
one might explore nearby hypothesis spaces to come up with an alternative account of the
evidence. Perhaps one might se le on the hypothesis that God-hating liberals are producing the
so-called ‘evidence’ for gender equality because they hate the natural order of things. This
conspiracy is very much able to explain the evidence presented of women being cut out for the
work. The truth of this undermining hypothesis eliminates the rival hypothesis (that women
really are cut out for the work) from consideration, and because one is now distributing one’s
credences over a smaller probability space, one might increase one’s credence in the original
hypothesis.14
Implicit motivated reasoning can also explain a crucial finding of Mann and Ferguson
[2015]: implicit a itudes that are newly formed are much more likely to be revised in light of
new evidence than those that are entrenched. Newly formed implicit a itudes are less likely to
be linked with a large network of deeply entrenched networks of affect and motivation, so when
new evidence is subsequently presented that the subject’s view is mistaken, there is no
self-regarding pressure on the subject to find a way to maintain the a itude. Once implicit
14 For a description of this process in much more detail, see Kelly [2008].
15
a itudes have been incorporated and entrenched in these complicated and mutually-reinforcing
networks, however, changing them becomes much harder. In a similar vein, the conflict
between evidence and self-conception in implicit thought can explain why children tend to
develop implicit a itudes that are (initially) more evidence sensitive than those in adults
[Charlesworth et al. 2020]. Children are still developing complicated networks of self-regard
during the same time they are developing implicit a itudes [Robins and Trzesniewski 2005],
and the lack of an established connection between the two reduces the rational pressure that
such a network can exert on a particular implicit belief that a child may develop.
It is not my goal here to give extensive empirical support to any particular explanation
of implicit a itude recalcitrance in terms of motivated reasoning, though I do think these
explanations are plausible. Instead, I want to point out the kinds of explanatory resources
focusing on inferential transitions gives the proponent of the belief view. Beliefs function in any
number of irrational or arational ways, and the belief theorist can use these facts to explain
otherwise baffling instances of recalcitrance in implicit a itudes. The opponent of the belief
view thinks there is a deep divide between the functional roles of beliefs and implicit a itudes;
but when we focus on how beliefs actually function, even at the explicit level, this claim loses
plausibility.
4.3 Moderate fragmentation
For most of this paper, I have been focusing on the recalcitrance of a single implicit
a itude when the subject is presented with countervailing information. I have been arguing that
looking at the possible inferential transitions such states can be embedded in helps to make
sense of their recalcitrance. But there is a second kind of recalcitrance often present in implicit
bias cases: an incoherence between explicit and implicit a itudes. It is common for subjects who
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endorse egalitarian explicit commitments to nonetheless harbor implicit a itudes that contradict
those commitments; this is the kind of case that motivated our reflection on Bias in the first
place. How should the proponent of the belief view make sense of this?15
It is not immediately obvious how a focus on implicit motivated reasoning could explain
this kind of case. If there is rational pressure being generated by a subject’s positive
self-conception, shouldn’t that pressure make it more likely that they will change their implicit
a itudes, especially when those a itudes are made explicit to them? What about members of
minority groups who develop negative implicit biases towards their own groups [Rudman and
Goodwin 2004], which seem to actively cut against their own positive self-conception? While I
do not think the notion of implicit motivated reasoning can generate compelling explanations in
all of these cases, some explanations are possible. To take just one example, it is likely that
implicit beliefs are usually formed ballistically [Mandelbaum 2015]: subjects take in ambient
information about what dominant social groups around them think of others and immediately
encode this as a belief. Once that belief is present, it itself generates some rational pressure to
modify other aspects of the belief-affect-self-conception network. This, in turn, might produce
something more akin to a self-deception case, where subjects are in some sense aware of their
implicit a itudes but tend to keep them out of deliberation as much as possible because of the
extreme cognitive dissonance they produce. It is plausible that many people are in some sense
aware of what they implicitly believe [Toribio 2018], so this result is not unwarranted.
Nonetheless, the belief theorist should freely admit that these explanations are not
airtight or fully satisfying. Instead, I think she should instead endorse a moderate realist
fragmentationism. The realist account of fragmentation given by Bendana and Mandelbaum
fails, in my estimation, not because of the underlying facts about fragmentation, but because a
15 See also the idea that implicit a itudes among dominant group members represent the ‘hidden biases’
of otherwise good people [Banaji and Greenwald 2013].
17
commitment to hyperspecificity of fragment creation undermines our ability to identify one and
the same a itude across different environments. On their account, there just is no answer to the
question of what a subject believes across different contexts. But one need not go in for this
extreme view to see the appeal of fragmentation as a theory of human mental architecture.
Indeed, it is hard to see how many of the results on human logical inconsistency [Cooper and
Duncan 1971] and so-called Spinozistic believing [Gilbert 1991] can be incorporated into a single
belief-web framework. So the idea that the human mind is divided up into several independent
belief stores itself becomes a feature the belief theorist can use to explain evidence recalcitrance
in implicit a itudes.
The explanatory resources of the belief view are thus multifaceted and intricate. In terms
of belief formation and storage, the belief theorist can appeal to a certain (probably small)
number of distinct fragments where beliefs can be stored, with strong intrafragment coherence
but li le interfragment coherence. If evidence is presented to the subject, one reason a particular
fragment might not update is because the information was not made available to that fragment.
This will not be plausible in many cases, however, especially in social cognition where most
information will be encoded exclusively in implicit fragments. Instead, the belief theorist should
appeal to a host of irrational and arational mental transitions that include belief states and that
mask the rational updating function of belief within a particular fragment. When these masking
features are removed, or when the newly produced a itude is not given sufficient time to
embed in the network, we see the rational updating of these states. But recalcitrance is no
surprise when dealing with long-term, entrenched networks of implicit belief, affect, and
motivation.
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Far from being singularly focused on belief storage, the explanatory resources of the
belief view are vast, and are supported by the available empirical evidence. The belief view, at16
the very least, represents an active and interesting research program that begets future work.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to expand the explanatory possibilities for the belief view of
the implicit a itudes. I take it there are two explanatory projects one needs to undertake if one
thinks implicit a itudes are beliefs: showing that their basic function is belief-like, and having
plausible explanations for purported differences between the two. Other authors have focused
on providing the former; here, I lay a pathway for the la er, focusing on the transitions that
occur within a particular implicit fragment. I think there are significant conceptual resources
here for making sense of the evidence recalcitrance of implicit a itudes, especially since
ordinary explicit beliefs are often recalcitrant in exactly the same ways. Implicit a itudes, like
belief more generally, are messy.
My goal has merely been to identify and explore some of the explanatory resources
available to the belief view. It remains for future work to confirm the particularities of any belief
account, and the epistemic value of the account rests partially on these empirical confirmations.
Some results (for instance, Charlesworth et al. [2020]) already seem to lend support, but clearly
much more work needs to be done. But much like the other proposals that the belief view
interacts with, I take it that the epistemic standing of the belief view rests both on empirical
16 There is another sense in which the current approach differs from others. Often some of the results
catalogued here are used to motivate the psychological immune system hypothesis [Mandelbaum 2019],
which states that the primary function of belief is not to update in light of evidence but to produce a
relatively functional person in the face of evidence of terribleness in the world and in ourselves. I do not
see why the defender of the belief view needs to commit themselves to a new constitutive aim of belief,
however. One can just as easily think belief does (functionally) aim at truth, and that unimpeded beliefs
will update in light of evidence. In the human mind, however, few things are unimpeded. The belief view
is thus separate from the psychological immune system hypothesis.
19
results and on the kind of philosophical and explanatory light such a view can throw on issues
we care about as philosophers of cognitive science and mind. Whether we can ultimately offer
an explanation that is both philosophically compelling and empirical supported will be the task
of future work, but the prognosis looks promising.
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